



RESEARCH ARTICLE

THE PARADOX OF THE PEDAGOGY OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSMISSION WITHOUT  
A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS

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ABSTRACT

Whatever else education is deemed to be, it is incontestable that it at least involves the transmission of knowledge. Considerable time and effort is thus devoted to this task in our schools. Teachers are trained to be sufficiently equipped with skills in a specialized subject area, thereby passing on to their students the knowledge they have acquired. Educational leaders have done much to ensure that knowledge is transmitted effectively in schools, and this task minimally requires that those who teach are proficient in the art and science of teaching. Notwithstanding this pedagogic orientation, we shall argue that it is logically ironic, if not paradoxical, that leadership in education has focused so much on the transmission of knowledge that we are left with little, if any, understanding of what knowledge itself is. We thus know much about the art and science of teaching, but we remain philosophically naive on the critical question of what it really means 'to know'. The reason we believe this is such an important question for educational leaders, and indeed for us all, is that whatever account is given of knowledge, it is clear upon reflection that knowledge is not value-free. In what follows we shall argue that the dominant forms of knowledge and the modality of technology which are essentially reconfigured applications of it, are perniciously value laden. To put it euphemistically, the ideological pills we sometimes unwittingly swallow with the pedagogic elixirs we imbibe end up being far more intoxicating than we ever expected. Without understanding the values covertly imparted with the knowledge we transmit in our schools, the way in which we inform, shape and condition the moral and socio-cultural consequences of our propaedeutic proficiencies will remain unknown to us. This being so, we will have no philosophical sense of whether the knowledge we transmit does a service or disservice to the deeper goals and purpose of education. Once the philosophical rationale which provides the purpose for teaching is lost, so is the purpose of learning. Without grounding education in a philosophical framework of purposive principles, education becomes exploited by vested interests as the primary tool by way of which society unreflectively reproduces itself. Education, that is to say, is co-operated and managerially regulated as an ideology of consumerism within which all relationships are ultimately commodified for utilitarian, not humanitarian purposes. In the final analysis we remain in ignorance of whether what is taught in our schools is genuinely worth knowing. In turn we lose sight of the truth that what we teach is a form of knowledge which, by its very nature, is fundamentally depersonalising, disconnecting, self-fragmenting and alienating, and perhaps not worth teaching at all. When this happens, the next query is whether schools of this kind are worth having at all.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years a number of philosophical thinkers have challenged the monopoly which the institution of western science has enjoyed in regard to the concept of knowledge (Suzuki and Dresel, 1999; Capra, 1989; Chalmers, 1982; Rifkin and Howard, 1980). Professor Ron Laura, however, from the University of Newcastle, has labored in particular to elaborate and articulate a pedagogic account of the 'ideology

of knowledge' that is both deeply challenging and enlightening (Ashton and Laura, 2012; Laura and Chapman, 2010; Laura, Marchant and Smith, 2008; Laura and Sylvester, 2007; Laura and Cotton, 2005; Ashton and Laura, 2004; Laura and Heaney, 2002). Our aim in this paper is to exhibit the relevance of these ideas for the field of leadership education. It is to be hoped that the originality we bring to this paper lay in helping at least modestly to push the frontiers of educational leadership further forward, and in so doing, to initiate a novel version of its which we shall call, 'The philosophy of Educational Leadership', based upon a more comprehensive understanding of epistemological pedagogy. The argument we wish to defend

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in this piece is that the form of knowledge which has come to dominate the western way of seeing the world is in essence just one particular form of knowing, and not its only form. In the West, that is to say, we have been seduced by a materialist paradigm that preserves the illusion that empiricist knowledge is in fact the only reliable form of knowledge, and that other contenders for the accolade of knowledge are only pretenders to the title. That scientific knowledge of this kind occupies this special status, we suggest, is because it encapsulates and presupposes a value or value system independently of its intended application, which caters to the human lust for power. The value system it implicitly promulgates not only reflects, but also reciprocally reinforces and conditions the character of western consciousness in this sense more determinately than do other aspirants to the epistemic crown. Of the various forms of knowledge available to human thought, western culture has opted for a form of knowledge which is motivated and defined by the preoccupation mankind has ascribed to the pre-eminent value of power and control. This being so, the specific form of knowledge we have institutionally embraced in our schools and universities is also conceptually shaped by an obsession to dominate and control the fate of every living and non-living thing on the face of the planet. Thus, the primary justification which motivates preferring one form of knowledge over another is structurally characterised by the *value* we attach to 'power' and the capacity it provides to control the world around us. The dominant paradigm of knowledge, that is to say, is itself both conditioned by and at the same time informs the way in which we institutionally express the human preoccupation with power and control. Our preoccupation with power gives rise to a "modality" of knowing which is itself covertly designed to enable the knowing subject to transform our relationship to the world around us, along with our relationships to each other, in ways that systematically increase our control over everything with which we interact. In essence, the predominant concept of knowledge we have culturally forged is conditioned in value terms by the very obsession with power that serves to prompt it. This being so, the power provided by knowledge is thus made technologically manifest as tools for subjugating nature in accord with socio-culturally expressed and ever changing needs for dominance and control.

### Exploring the realm of "power epistemology"

The insatiable appetite for power over our world and over each other has become an elemental facet of the western world view, which can now be seen to have imperialized much of the globe. 'Power Epistemology,' as we shall call it, has come to shape the dominant expression of knowledge which has now been embraced educationally, virtually worldwide. (Laura, Marchant and Smith, 2008; Laura and Cotton, 1999). In their book "The New Social Disease", Laura and his co-authors write, "The drive for power and control spawns a competitive mode of interaction which impacts upon every aspect of our lives. Not only has it led to the desanctification of our natural world through the mindless expropriation of the earth's resources, but it serves also to undermine and depersonalise human relationships on many levels. Put simply, power for the sake of dominance and control disrupts our cohesive patterns of connectivity and human interaction". As Zukav (1989) also insightfully attests, "the same energy that sent warships to the Persian Gulf sent soldiers to Vietnam and Crusaders to Palestine. The energy that separated the family of Romeo from the family of Juliet is the same energy that separates the racial family of the black husband from the racial family of the

white. The energy that led Lee Harvey Oswald against John Kennedy is the same energy that set Cain against Abel. Brothers and sisters quarrel for the same reason that corporations quarrel - they seek power over one another" (1990:23).

### Knowledge, external power and subjugation

The overriding perception of external power we proffer here is characterised by relationships of domination and subjugation. Examples of the pervasiveness of such external forms of power are plentiful. Consider, for instance, the extent to which our institutions, whether they are social, financial or political rely upon symbolic manifestations of power. The police, not unlike the military, exist as prime exemplars of our conception of external power. Their external power is made conspicuous through the symbolic display of badges, uniforms, weapons, and armour (Laura and Cotton, 2005). Even the embedded power of controlling rhetoric, propaganda and subtleties of psychological abuse can be reconfigured in linguistic exemplifications of disempowerment in their own right (Laura, Marchant and Smith, 2008). What is less often realised is that the power of such images exists in their ability to operate concomitantly as symbols of fear. The politically oppressed of Nazi Germany learned all too quickly to fear the ruthless and invidious institution of power represented by the swartzsticker of the Nazi SS, for example. These symbols of fear were brandished in their own right as weapons of psychological dehumanisation against those outside the circle of power. Such examples can function as covert and/or overt symbols that exemplify the subjugative values that can be enshrined within our institutional structures. Uniforms worn by the Nazi SS, and flags which paraded the blackness of their power serve as vivid illustrations of external power presumptions and their subjugative power as symbols which suppress some segments of the community, while others benefit from their corrupt and spurious ideological legitimisation.

### Power-based educational knowledge and the supremacy of empiricist science

If the knowledge transmitted within our educational institutions is conditioned and informed by our preoccupation with power, both its form and purpose will reflect that preoccupation by virtue of its application. If what we profess to know is covertly defined by the capacity of what is known to afford us a power advantage over the world and the things within it, the conventional view that knowledge is neither good nor bad in itself can be revealed for the meretricious claim that it is. Far from being value neutral, every piece of information which is deemed to be knowledge and derived from this source is designed covertly to grant an increasing degree of control over every living and inanimate thing on the planet. . As Capra opines, "it is generally not recognised that values are not peripheral to science and technology but constitute their very basis and driving force. During the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century, values were separated from facts, and ever since that time we have tended to believe that scientific facts are independent of what we do and therefore independent of our values. In reality, scientific facts emerge out of an entire constellation of human perceptions, values, and actions from which they cannot be separated" (1997:11). Given that the socio-cultural preoccupation with power acts as a catalyst in determining what we accept as knowledge, our argument is that the dominant concept of knowledge is conditioned by an

endogenous compulsion or 'directedness towards power' that transcends any beneficent intention that may otherwise motivate its application. This being so, it is clear that the conventional wisdom that what makes a specific form of knowledge good or bad is simply a matter of the way in which that form of knowledge is used, evinces a misunderstanding and a 'conceptual distortion of a far subtler truth' (Laura and Cotton, 2005).

Deeper reflection reveals that when knowledge is itself substantively defined by the preoccupation with power, the resultant form of knowledge will recapitulate the presuppositional value of dominance and control which motivates it. This being so, every application of that form of knowledge will serve the aim of 'knowing' only in so far as it guarantees some measure of control and methodological subjugation. Whenever we deploy this power-motivated theory of knowledge, no matter how well-intentioned, the technological exemplifications which derive from it will, ineluctably and for the most part, systematically transform the things to which it is applied into other things which are more readily controlled by virtue of the deconstructed transformations we make of them. The covert 'directionality' of technological reductionism to achieve greater control lies in the acquisition of greater predictability. The process which characterises this epistemic dynamic is what Laura calls, the "Principle of Transformative Subjugation" (Laura, 2010). Our use of the Principle of Transformative Subjugation here refers to the way in which we maximise the measure of predictive control of the world around us by deploying our technology to transform as much of the world around us as possible into regimented configurations of highly chemicalized, artificial, synthetic, inert, and lifeless reconstructions of the living world (Laura and Chapman, 2009). A simple example of 'transformative subjugation', but with profound implications, can be found in the technologicalization of our homes, workplaces, and school, environments in which we and our children spend most, or certainly much of our time. Notice first that each of these environments is highly synthesised. The rooms in which we voluntarily live, work, or study are artificially heated in winter, thereby dramatically changing the natural character of the air we would otherwise breathe. In summer we often use air conditioning to cool these same rooms, thereby once again significantly transforming the character of the air we breathe. Cement floors in these buildings are mostly covered in carpets which are synthetic and can, especially when new; give off gaseous fumes dangerous to our health.

The same is true of the laminated tables and desks at which we eat, sit or work, along with much of the woodwork around our rooms, which is also laminated. Most of our chairs are made of synthetic materials, usually of some combination of plastic and metal, along with artificial fabrics and foam internals which constitute the chair back and seat pod. Similarly, in the same dwellings we expose ourselves to artificial light sources which illuminate the rooms, or provide the projection lighting for our computers and other forms of visual display units, including overheads and film display equipment. Even the synthetic paint we apply to walls and ceilings can contribute toxic fumes to the already poorly ventilated air we breathe. Last but not least, the window glass is also synthetic and dramatically changes the wavelength of natural sunlight as it passes through the glass to enter the room. The entry of natural sunlight into the body is through the eyes and skin, and the specific

wavelength of that light source supplies messages to cellular receptors within our body to produce regulatory hormonal sequences, some of which form the basis of potent anti-cancer agents, and generalised enhanced immunity. (For more on the topic see, Laura and Ashton (1999); Hidden Hazards, Ashton and Laura (2004). We submit that the impact of such transformations upon our world, has adverse effects on personal health and our spiritual and mental well-being, which have not yet been fully comprehended. Bountiful examples make palpably clear, however, that the price we pay in terms of the proliferation of toxins which now poison our personal and community environments is prohibitive. In addition to the health issues associated with the deconstruction and consequent fabrication of the things found, or once found in nature, the measure of control brought about by our technological subjugations extends also to the way in which power-driven epistemology leads ineluctably to the depersonalisation of human relationships and to the dehumanisation of those who are caught up in them. Similarly, transformative subjugation leads also to the desanctification of nature. It is clear that the epistemology of power thesis stands as a salutary reminder that we have as a culture inadvertently "let our schools and many of our social institutions become the state-sanctioned vehicles for the cultural implantation of an ideology of power and control" (Laura and Sylvester, 2007).

### **Scientism: propagating the myth of methodological deconstructionism**

The irony is that the socio-cultural supremacy of empiricist science, and the concept of knowledge as an exemplification of power epistemology, covertly promulgates an ideology of what we shall call 'methodological deconstructionism', as the primary tool to mediate transformative subjugation. To increase the measure of control we can have of the world around us, we endeavour to maximise its predictability by deconstructing it into component parts which can then be reconstructed into more predictable fabrications. 'Methodological deconstructionism' is parasitic upon epistemic reductionism. The nature of deconstructionism, that is to say, is to dismantle the item under consideration by reducing it to its component parts. The presumption embedded here is that the analysis of the individual components of a thing becomes more predictable than the analysis of the complex whole in which those parts featured as constituents. While it may be true that the reductionist deconstruction affords more predictive control than more complex wholes, we also become more disconnected and morally aloof when whole things are broken down into parts. Our moral sensibilities associated with "equal consideration of interest", for example, make sense when we speak of persons who have interests; not when we speak of the various parts of which they are constituted. Once it has been determined that it is in the best interest of an individual to have an appendix removed, there is little point in morally discussing what is in the best interest of the appendix. What is also relinquished in the transition from wholes to parts is our understanding of the integrity of wholeness through which the emergent properties which define it as whole can be comprehended as characterising its uniqueness and emergent potential. For example, consider the deconstructionist reductionism of water. When water is broken down into its components, we have two elements, namely, two parts hydrogen and one part water. Knowing this, we can then obtain a great deal of predictive information about each of these elements. Nevertheless, it is clear that the isolated analysis we

make of these elements respectively cannot explain or predict the emergent and resultant property of their combination, 'water', which bears no resemblance to either one of its component elements in isolation. The methodology of deconstructionist reductionism takes us to a level of more predictive quantitative exploration, but the predictive control we have of the components of a thing are not necessarily a measure of the predictive control of the thing itself. The obsession with quantitative analysis betrays the presumption that mensuration itself can be regarded as a form of control, and thus, the more we can quantify our epistemic claims, the more objective and controlled we think they are. Laura has elsewhere dubbed this epistemic leap of faith, 'statistical vertigo' (Laura and Marchant, 2003). While the methodology of quantification is admittedly of paramount importance to science, quantitative regimentation can also lead to an ever increasing conformist methodology of science, implicitly encapsulated within the academic world as a socio-cultural modality of intellectual imperialism. The pressure towards scientific compliance is witnessed by the fact that the socio-cultural role of faculties of science within universities has in recent decades radically changed. The concept of a faculty of science has ceased to connote just one kind of academic faculty amongst many other faculties. Within the framework of hidden agenda, the word 'science' stands instead as an intellectual benchmark of accountability, against which all other faculties are tacitly compared, measured, and covertly made to conform. Science is not just a name of a faculty; it is the sociocultural nomenclature for an all-embracing world-view. The dominance of science has brought us to the epoch of socially legitimated 'scientism', where science as a particular mode of knowledge acquisition has become the measure of the kind of knowledge that makes all faculties worth having. As early as 1983 Richards wrote, (Richard, 1983) "the term 'Science' is now so widely applied that any definition risks offending those whose particular usage appears to be excluded. To say of something that it is 'scientific' is to encourage the view that it is altogether respectable and must be taken seriously" (1983:1). We submit that to be involved in the enterprise of science oneself, or even to be aligned with those who are, has become a status symbol in itself, thus creating considerable and sometimes overwhelming pressure towards methodological and terminological conformity.

### Terminological Conformity

In a milieu of convoluted scientific imperialism it is no surprise that science has partisans everywhere. One need only canvass the evolution of the nominal identities taken on by existing university departments. To appreciate the extent to which the cultural domination of science has shaped our dependence on the epistemology of power and conformism of its methodological modalities, consider the following. The aegis of what was one called 'natural or physical science' has been extended, almost imperceptibly, to include all of science, based upon empirical methodologies of predominantly quantitative designations. The proliferation of 'partisan terminology' is exemplified by the continuing evolution of recent discipline designations of departmental titles. These changes in designation bear witness to the fact that university departments which were previously identified by a less value-laden nomenclature have succumbed to conformist pressures which reflect the extent to which science functions as an all-embracing world-view. Names such as the 'department of politics' have long ago been vanquished in favor of a

scientized value-laden title such as the 'department of political science'. Similarly, the 'department of sociology' has now become known as the 'department of social science'. The attempt to legitimate the work of the university itself by making its diverse areas of study seem more conformed to scientific methodology is further illustrated by recent shifts to titles such as 'health science', 'behavioural science', 'horticultural science', 'food science', 'philosophy of science', and even 'mortuary science'. Because the epistemic goal of science is to make the world as predictable as possible, the tendency is to strip the world naked of its qualitative dimensions so that its more predictable quantitative aspects can be unified. The more quantitative a domain, the more readily its subject matter can be subsumed under the laws of science. The more amenable a subject-matter is to scientific laws which ensure predictability, the more objective, so the argument goes, is the investigation undertaken.

The institution or establishment of science has itself to some extent become a form of 'scientism', and in essence, the secular religion of our times. Despite the noble efforts of qualitative researchers, their qualitative work is often recast in quantitative terms by way of having to use quantitative statistical measures to interpret their results so that such results can be made to conform to the empiricist canons of scientific accountability. What is not amenable to quantification becomes regarded as less rigorous, if not subjective and outside the province of scientific knowledge. The quantitative issues fall within the aegis of science, while qualitative issues of philosophical insight are often marginalized as the idle musing of the arts. From the vantage of pedagogic epistemology, it is clear that implicit in the dominant epistemological ideology of power and in turn in the very structure of the academic establishment itself, exists a form of 'epistemic discrimination'. One need only consider the disparity in the dispersal of grant money per capita between arts staff on the one hand and the science community, on the other. Despite protestations to the contrary, the stigma still exists by way of epistemological presumption that students working in the arts areas are 'in fact' working in academic areas which are subjective and are thus involved in research areas of lesser value. The implicative stereotype that emerges is that qualitative research is a less objective and thus less reliable than qualitative knowledge in the sense of what is truly important and worth knowing (1999:132; see also Henry 2002; Laura, 2010).

## DISCUSSION

### Theory of Transformative Subjugation

Here we wish to make explicit the extent to which the value-ladenness of technology can serve negatively to influence even supposedly beneficial applications of it. As intimated earlier, one facet of the logical character of technologies motivated by power is their design for transforming the world of nature into increasingly synthesised and artificial environments. A version of this transformation extends to the technologization of human relationships. Virtually every application of an technology of power results in the systematic conversion of both the animate and inanimate world into increasingly inert, chemicalized, or highly fossilised things. In the case of human relationships, this transformation leads to depersonalised interactions that engender greater control and predictability (Laura and Cotton, 2005; Laura and Heaney, 2002; Laura,

Marchant and Smith, 2008). As we observed earlier, technologies of power are intrinsically designed to control the things and processes of the natural world by transforming them into more predictable things and processes. We observed also that they do this by reducing vital networks or systems of energy as found in nature into increasingly inert and chemicalized reconstructions of them. Part of the covert rationale for technologization is that the techniques deployed transform the world in such a way that the products of technology are implicitly shaped to suit our interests. This being so, our interaction with nature has been confined largely to our technological attempts designed to dominate and control it by restructuring the things of nature to make them behave as we would wish them to behave. We thus devise transformative technologies of subjugation to 'force the world' to adapt to us. If night falls, we simply use the technology of luminescent power to light up our sporting fields and turn night into day. When our food crops do not grow fast enough, or as abundantly we would like, we coax them to obey our will through chemical fertilisation of the soil, or by genetically engineering the plants themselves to grow bigger and faster. If our food produce does not transport well, we engineer it with thicker and more resilient skins to make it travel better. Moreover if our food goods do not possess a long enough shelf-life to make marketing them worthwhile, we either irradiate them or dose them with preservatives chemically-based coverings which inhibit their demise (as in waxed apples). Alternatively, we excise or take from our foods their most living parts so that they are less likely to decay and putrefy on the shelves on which they are sold or stored (Laura, 2010). Until recently, much of bread processing and technologization involved excising the germ of wheat from its kernel to ensure that the resulting product would be so inert and over-chemicalized that a loaf of bread would become almost invulnerable to decay. It is clear that the way in which technology achieves this control is to convert living things into other things which are synthesised, artificial, and in essence dead.

As a culture, we are bedazzled by the wonders of technology and lamentably fail to notice that our technologies are, by virtue of the value of power they provide, being used to transform living things and environments into inert and lifeless things and places; all in the name of progress and technological development. We neglect to see that the things we have synthesised have been transformed into inert things which are subject to our control, but only because their transformative subjugation has converted the world around us, at virtually every level, into highly synthesised and artificial environments of chemicalized and lifeless things, often of toxic impact upon us (Laura, 2008; Laura 2010; Suzuki and Dressel, 1999). Within the context of the epistemology of power ideology and the technologies of power which derive from it, control is attained through technological transformations which make what is transformed sufficiently predictable to maximise control. The more alive and vital something is, the more difficult it is to predict and control its behaviour. This being so, an epistemological compensatory methodology is enacted to technologize the world by increasing the level of its synthetic fabrication. A simple example of this methodological synthesising is all too clear in our commercial processing of food. One need only look at the ingredient descriptions displayed on the food products which fill our market shelves to see the panoply of chemicals that now constitute the foods we mindlessly take into our bodies. There is no doubt that the

chemicalisation of our food has augmented the level of our commercial control over food. We can significantly increase the 'shelf life' of various foods by chemically extending their longevity to lengths never thought imaginable. The more synthetic or chemicalized become the components of the foods we eat, the greater the degree of maximising any of the range of predictive outcomes associated with it. What we tend to neglect or hopelessly misunderstand is that the very concept of 'increased shelf life' is tantamount to a revelatory 'oxymoron', since the only reason the foods in question actually last or enjoy long 'shelf-lives' is that they are 'lifeless'. The natural cycle for living foods over time involves decay and putrefaction. The reason technologized foods resist these natural ageing processes is simply because they have become more chemically reconstructed than naturally constituted. They possess 'shelf-life' only in the perverse and paradoxical sense that they persist, not because they are alive, but because they are chemically inert and dead.

The more general Paradox of Transformative Subjugation is that technologies of power do access us to a measure of predictive control over the world by transforming nature into a museum of regimented, chemicalized, sanitised, inert and all too often, dead things. The kingdom over which we have become technological kings is ironically a kingdom of inert and dead things. As Laura has elsewhere opined, "Having surrounded ourselves so gladly with things which are inert, lifeless and even dead, is it any surprise that we ourselves should feel less alive, less vital, less enthusiastic for and capable of authentic relationships and joyous living and a healthy life" (Laura, 2004). The problem is not simply the highly visible issue of environmental degradation, as witnessed by the frequently debated despoiling of our waterways, or even of our toxic assaults upon the soil; or our relentless pollution of the air we breathe and the incessant plundering of the earth's mining resources.

The ramifications of the theory of transformative subjugation are far more subtle and show that the fundamental philosophy of nature we have embraced covertly promulgates an ideology of 'power epistemology' within our schools that has led us inadvertently to participate in the degradation of the environment with impunity and neglect the extent to which our methodological deconstructions of it have led to our own alienation from it, and all too often, from each other (Laura, 2008). The more power we invoke to take technological control of the world around us, the more we systematically transform and synthesise it into something from which we are, by virtue of our own nature, irremediably disconnected. The more we reconstruct and fabricate it, the more artificial it becomes, and the more unwittingly we are disfranchised from the world of nature. The more disenfranchised we in turn become from the earth, and the more connected we are to the things of our technological fabrications, the easier it becomes for us with ignorant expressions of good will and intension, to continue to manipulate, expropriate, and degrade it. The more our moral sensibilities are compromised, the more we decimate and exploit everything around us without conscience.

## **Conclusion**

We have argued that whatever else education is reckoned to be, it at least involves the transmission of knowledge. It is clear that enormous emphasis is placed in education upon ensuring that teachers are effective transmitters of knowledge

and this is understandable. What remains paradoxical and disconcerting is that so much time is spent on teaching teachers how to transmit knowledge, that insufficient time and not enough serious reflective consideration is given to the question of what knowledge is; and of what it is that we transmit in the name of knowledge. Once we recognise that values are covertly promulgated which by their very nature disconnect and alienate us from the world around us, then we also need to ask the question whether we have lost the 'soul' of our culture and education by doing so. Knowledge, whatever the intentions of its use, enshrines specific values which inevitably condition its application in ways which supersede those intentions. We argued that knowledge is heavily value-laden, and that the value it covertly recapitulates with its transmission is the value of power. Knowledge is in essence an expression of power that institutionally manifests itself epistemically as a modality of dominance and control. The question then becomes to what extent the transmission of knowledge is tantamount to the promulgation of an ideology of control and subjugation over the world around us that disconnects us from it and in doing so, encourages our mindless desanctification and destruction of it, and each other.

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